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Introduction for:
MULLIGAN
At Fordham Law, students often debate the roles that
judicial restraint and judicial activism should play in our legal
system.

Supporters of judicial activism argue that an innovative

judiciary is essential to clearly define and protect individual
rights in a world far more complex than that of the founding
fathers.

Opponents of judicial activism criticize the doctrine

as anti-democratic, because unelected judges can substitute their
judgments for those of a popularly elected legislature. From
Constitutional Law classes to late afternoon meetings of the
Federalist Society, debate over the costs and benefits of
judicial activism occurs almost daily in the safe halls of our
law school.
Outside law school halls, the debate is not always safe.
For California Superior Court Judge Howard Broadman, an activist
sentence he

i~posed

in January 1991 almost cost him his life.

When a mother plead guilty to child abuse,

Judge Broadman

conditioned her probation in part on acceptance of a surgically
implanted contraceptive device.

Judge Broadman's sentence drew

volleys of praise and criticism from all over the country.

Two

months later in his courtroom, a self-proclaimed holy warrior
against contraception pulled out a gun and fired at the judge's
head.

Judge Broadman was not hit, but the assassination attempt

stands as an extreme example of the stress judicial activism can
place on the legal system.
Judge William Hughes Mulligan's Sennett Lecture examines

the roles of judicial activism and judicial restraint in the
context of Cruel and Unusual punishment cases.

Judge Mulligan

analyzes the workings of the ''proportionality principle", a
feature of eighth amendment jurisprudence that allows a federal
court to strike down a punishment that is, in its judgment,
excessively severe.

Judge Mulligan's topic illuminates the

difficulties experienced by the judicial branch when it sets
aside a punishment approved by the legislature.
Judge Mulligan's conclusion, that federal courts should
def er to the state legislatures on the proper length of sentences
for criminal offenses, is particularly relevant in today's "get
tough on crime'' environment.

As the national war on drugs wages

on, individual states lengthen sentences, build more prisons, and
create alternative methods of punishing criminals.

Military-

style boot camps and electronic tracking devices used to enforce
house arrest are just two examples of recent innovations in the
fight against crime.

Sooner or later, many of these and other

measures will be challenged on constitutional grounds.

Judge

Mulligan's support for the legislature's role is important; his
analysis will help to dispose of the weaker of these challenges
while preserving the Court's status as protector of eighth
amendment rights.

come to be entertained
are doomed to disappointment.

This paper is devoted

to the subject of cruel and unusual punishment and you
may well be subjected to it this evening.

Since the

fifty footnotes take up less space than the text, I
toyed with the idea of reading them instead. ·

However,

my law clerks felt that although the text was not that
great it was probably
footnotes.

~ore

understandable than the

This paper was the result of my writing

Carmona v. Ward which involved an attack on the
Constitutionality of the New York Penal Law provisions
mandating lifetime parole terms in certain drug
convictions.

dealing

The New York Courts had unamimously upheld the

constitutionality of the law as applied in those cases 3 appellate divisions had ruled and finally the New York
Court of Appeals.

In the Southern District Court the

statute was held unconstitutional and the Second Circuit
reversed 2 to 1.

The Supreme Court earlier this month denied

certiorari 7 to 2 - Judges Marshall and Powell dissenting.
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put aside and I would read you instead a chapter on
Offer or Acceptance according to Calamari and Perillo.
I am thankful to my current law clerks Mike
Malone and Mary Anne Wirth for their assistance and
cribism and primarily of course to Charles Carberry
who worked closely with me on Carmona.

All three are

graduates of the great Fordham Law School, of course .

..

The Sennett Lecture
Fordham University Scbric.,J r,f 1 ..i ·~;
January 30, 1979

"Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The Proportionality Rule"
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in the usual stark and unadorned constituional
"~

prose "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive

(:j

fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punislunents inflicted.'

The constitutional restriction binds both the legislative and
judicial branches of the federal government and through the

2)
Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the states as well.
While both branches are governed by the constitutional limita. tion, our system of judicial review .provides an enormous
potential power for the federal judiciary to strike down
sentences presUJl'l.ably fixed by state legislatures as appropriate sanctions reflecting the judgment of their constituencies
as to the seriousness of particular criminal offenses.
This paper is primarily concerned with only one
aspect of the "cruel and unusual" clause--the so-called
proportionality principle which simply expressed is that a
punishment ,.;hich is grossly or excessively severe in relaticnship to the gravity of the crime charged must be struck down
by the courts as ,,violative of the Eighth Amendment.

Even··,

~· ·

3)
before Gilbert and Sullivan's Mikado, i t had been an article
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of popular faith that the punishment fit the crime.

In

American jurisprudence however this is deemed to be the
responsibility of the legislature which created the crime
and fixed the sanction.

Only recently has it become recog-

nized that punishment grossly in excess of the gravity of
the offense may offend the Constitution of the United States.
I will briefly review the history of the principle and the test
which has been developed to apply it.

I

will suggest some

inherent weaknesses and dangers in the test and indicate the
balancing of principles which must be employed in applying
it lest it become a device for the imposition of judicial
concepts of criminal punishment in the guise of constitutional
interpretation.

The history of the cruel and unusual punishment
4)

clause has been set forth in several law review articles

5)
and in expansive judicial opinions.

There is no need to

present it in detail here.

The

phrase~tsel~~and

unusual punishments",

first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 which
prohibited such sanctions.

Historians generally have
... ·

perceived the prohibition to be a reaction to the treason
trials of 1685--the ." Bloody Assize" caused by the abortive

. ::. -,:~

;,·

- 3 rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth.

The penalty for treason

committed by a man involved hanging by the neck, to be cut
down while still alive and then disembowelled, beheaded and
6)

quartered.

I omit some of the more grisly details.

That the methods of punishment employed by the English
then and later were cruel and barbarous by today's standards
is quite apparent.
There is another view which has gained some acceptance that the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" was inserted
in the English Bill of Rights not simply as an interdiction
of barbarous methods of punishment but also to prohibit
sentences which were disproportionate to the gravity of the
crime conunitted.

One theory is that the conviction of the

infamous Titus Oates for perjury in 1685 and his subsequent
sentence support the proposition that a sentence disproportionate
to the crime was cruel and unusual within the meaning of the
Bill of Rights.
In 1679 Oates had sworn that he was present at a
meeting where a group of influential Catholic laymen and
Jesuit priests had plotted to murder the Protestant King
Charles II and to place his brother James, a Catholic,

-· . ....::: -- .
....

upon the throne.

-
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Oatcc who had a vivid

ima~ination

provided certain

lurid details--the Jesuits were to kill the King with silver
bullets and if that failed four Irish Ruffians were to stab
him to death.

As a reEult of the alleged "Popish Plot",

panic prevailed in London and as a result of Oates'
testimony a score of innocent Catholics were executed in
the manner heretofore described.

James II eventually did

ascend the throne, evidence of Oates' perjury became overwhelming and in 1685 he was convicted of perjury; sentenced to
prison for life, severely flogged, fined, placed in a
pillory four times a year and defrocked as a Minister of
the Church of England.

After the revolution of 1688, the

flight of James II and the ascension to the throne of
l·~ illiam

and Mary of Orange, Oates was not only pardoned but

even given a lifetime pension.
An influential law review article which has espouse
the view that "cruel and unusual punishments" should be
equated with the disproportionality of the sentence and not
simply the barbarity of the method of punishment, argued
that Oates' sentence was cruel and unusual not because of
which were
the flogging and pillaring/normal methods of punishment

. . . ..

-
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those days but because a term of life imprisonment was dis-

7)
proportionate to the crime of perjury.

This argument in

my view is, unpersuasive both logically and historically.
Oates' perjury has led directly to the barbaric execution of
some 21 innocent Catholics including seven Jesuits, one of

8)
whom was the provincial of the English Society.

Winston

· Churchill hardly an Angla._phob~ in his discussion of the
"Popish Plot" describes Oates as "being as wicked as any man

9)
·who ever lived."

The usual punishment for perjury

10)
included "branding or tongue boring, or both".
Oates' sentence viewed in the light of contemporary
penological practices was neither cruel or unusual.

His

eventual release and reward by William of Orange was not
due to any belief that he had been subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment but as described by a modern biographer of
Oates, it was "as an act of gratitude by William of Orange
who knew his friends and recognized the instruments which
11)

helped him attain the throne of England."

While Titus

Oates was a fascinating as well as frightening character,
l do not believe his sentence casts any light upon the
meaning of the phrase cruel and unusual nor does it support
.:.·-· .=·

the proportionality principle.

l

[

-'\ · ~
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- GIn 1791 the same phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" was adopted with little debate as part of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

It is quite
!·

clear that the framers intended to outlaw barbarous punishments.

The first Eighth Amendment cases to come before the

Supreme Court established that punishments involving torture
or lingering death which were acceptable to our Anglo
Saxon legal forbears, were cruel and unusual under the inter12) jL-~~~~~~~~~~~-

diction of the Eighth Amendment.
r

f n In rs Kemmler, 136

U.S. 436, 447 (1890) the Court held that death by electrocution was not cruel and unusual under either the New York or
United States Constitutions.

\

The question as to whether a term of .ir:':priscr.rnent
could be so excessively disproportionate to the offense so
as tc be within the Eighth Amendment was not addressed in the
Supreme Court until 1892 and then only in dicta in a dissenting
opinion.

In O'Neil v.

144 U.S. 323,
defendant, who was licensed

Vermont~jthe

to sell liquor in New York, had been sentenced to 19,914 days
the
(over 54 years) for conviction on 307 counts of/illegal sale
of liquor shipped to Vermont.

The majority did not reach the

question of whether the penalty violated the Eighth .Amendment
- .. '- .

13) .:. . .- : .2- -~ .,__. .::.~
since that point· had not been raised as error.
However,
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- 7 in his disce:nting opinion Mr. Justice Fic.:ld, considering the
fact that the penalty was more harsh than could have been
imposed for burglary or manslaughter, concluded that "[i]t
was one which, in its severity, considering the offences
of which [the defendant] was convicted, may justly be

14)
termed· both unusual and cruel."
In 1910 the Suprell1e Court decided Weems v. United

15)
States

which is now regarded as the seminal case with

J

respect to the proportionality principle.

The defendant, an

official of the Philippine goverrunent, was convicted of
falsifying public records and was sentenced under the Penal
Code of the Philippines, then a United States territory, to
15 years cf hare and pa inf u 1 labor, ·1.-i th a c!:.::..in at the
ankle hanging from the wrists.

Ee was

stri~ped

cf the right

of parental authority, guardianship of person or property,
participation in the family council, marital authority, the
administration of property and the right to dispose cf his
property.

He was placed under surveillance by the state

for the rest of his life, could not vote, hold office,
receive

retire.rne~t

permission.

pay or even change his re:=iaer:ce \·:i thou::

16}
Only six judges participated in this
-·.~

i:
'

i
l

-
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decision and two, White and Ilolmes, dissented.

The majority

found that this punishment was "cruel in its excess of
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment.

It is unusual in its character.

Its punishments come

under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account
,,17)
of their degree and kind.

(Emphasis supplied).

The Court

was repulsed by the nature of the penalty as well as its
the
lack of proportion to/seriousness of the underlying crime.
Thus, the

Co~rt

cc~pared

the punishment of the defendant to

those imposed in the same jurisdiction for crimes which the
Court considered to be more serious than the one for v;hich
18)

the defendant had been convicted.
punishment unc:ier attack v:ith those

It also compared the
irr~posec

in ether juris-

19)
cictions for the same crime.

These two steps have become
20)

major parts of the contemporary proportionality test.
While the language of Weems does suppcrt the doctrine
of proportionality, it must be remembered that the Court was
considering not simply a 15 year prison term but one accompanied by npainful labor" in chains, lifetime supervision and
civil interdiction.

It is difficult indeed to believe that

the Supreme Court would have held a 15 year term of imprisonl

l

ment unconstitutional had i t not been for the barbarous

I

21)

terms which accompanied and, indeed, followed its service.

l

-

~~~T

-

- 9 Weems is an important decision in any event because
of its affirmation of two principles of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the first of which is indeed basic and the
second almost obvious.

The first is as the Court stated:

[T]here is a certain subordination of the
judiciary to the legislature.

The function

of the · legislature is primary, its exercises
fortified by presumptions of right and legality,
and it is not to be interfered

~ ith

lightly,

nor by any judicial conception of their
wisdom or propriety.

They have no limitation,

we repeat, but constitutional ones, and what those
22)

are the judiciary must judge.
The second is that the Eighth Amendment prohibition

23)
is evolutionary in nature.

This principle was succinctly

formulated by Chief Justice Warren:

"The Amendment must dra,·.'

its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark

24)
I believe that there

the progress of a maturing society."

may well be some question as to whether we Americans have,
~hether

in general espou sed higher standa rds of decency and

"!:~

·· : ·_~

our society is becoming more instead of less mature.
.

Nonetheless
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in the context of cri1r1ir1i..tl

J (J

-

~i.lr1ctions

no one

cun

scriou~ly

I

contest the proposition that the physical and mental human tGrture,

I

degradation and loss of personal dignity acceptable to the
Sassenach or the Sioux have long since been rejected, at least
in democratic societies.

Hence it is beyond doubt that what

was an acceptable sanction at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution is hardly permissible today and forms no
basis for judicial inquiry to determine Constitutional
criteria.
What is significant is that since 1·: eerns was decideC.
in 1910 there has been no opinion in the Supre.-:ie Court i·:hic:-_
has struck down a non-capital punisrunent on proportionality
grounds.

Indeed, since then there has bee n only one et h er

case in which a majority of that Court founC. that
penalty violated the cruel and unusual

p~~islli~ ent

a · ncn-ca ~ ~ ~ ~l

clause.

25)

as noted by Chief Judge KaufrnaP.

Robinson v. California,

-~

26)

a prior Sennett Lecture

cou:~

the Court ruled that a person

not be convicted of a crime simply because he suffered

fr c ~ .

condition or status of being addicted to a narcotic drug.
~lthough

the two are often confused,

w he~her

a certain

should be a crime and whether the punishment should fit

27)

crime are entirely separate inquiries.

t~e

I

- 11 Throughout the present decade the Supreme Court
has struggled with the apparently intractable problem of
28)

capital punishment.

A judge must be careful in applying

these precedents, in which a majority opinion is rare and
which involve the ultimate irrevocable sanction to cases
involving much different considerations because of the lesser
29)

penalties involved.

However, from the opinions in the

death penalty cases two propositions are clear.

One is that

the Supreme Court accepts the principle of proportionality as
30)

constitutionally mandated.

The other is that there is a

strong presumption that the legislative penalty is valid
because "the constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgr..ent
31)

weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards."
Whether or not the proportionality concept was

~ithin

the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the Bill of
Rights of 1689 or in the minds of the founding fathers when
the Eighth Amendment was adopted is really academic.

It has
I-

32)

I

now been espoused in principle by the Supreme Court,

the

33)

New York Court of Appeals
. ..

·~

-- - 3 4)

State

Courts~ ~-

as well as a large number of

t

- 12 -

II
The cases have developed a generally accepted three
pronged test to determine whether a sentence is so excessively
disproportionate to the r~;m~ that it violates the Eighth
Amendment.

The three steps are--f irst, a judgment by the

court of the gravity of the offense.

Second--a comparison of

the sentence under review with that imposed in the same
j ur,isO.icticn for otLr:r er i :r.,r:s 1·.'h ich the cc.iurt considers to b r:

more serious; and third--a comparison of the challenged
sentence with those ir.,posed in other jurisdictions for the

35)
same crime.

There is even authority that the comparison can

36)
include the penalties imposed by foreign nations.
The aim of the test is to reduce the input of judicial subj ecti vi ty in Eighth Amendment j ur is prudence.

i·7hile c.

th!:ee pronged test f 2ci2lly phrased .:..!'. ob j e :-ti '.re ter.:-.s is
to be lightly discarded (and I suppose must be viewed with
more respect than a two pronged test,) I am frankly becoming
less and less convinced that the proportionality rubric is
of any real value in cases where the only claim is that the
Eighth Amendment has been violated sir..ply because of the
l

length of the term imposed.

I

There is no case in fact in

i

iI
I
I

_,i.

- 13 either the Suprem~ Court, the S8cond Circuit, or th0 New
York Court of Appeals where a sentence has ever been set aside
37)

for this reason even though the test has been accepted.
This is because Weems itself has emphasized the great deference
which must be paid to the state legislature.

As Chief Justice

Marshall pointed out in 1820, "It is the legislature, not the
38)

court, which is to define a crime, . and ordain its punishment."
Mr. Justice Ste>·; art has recently er.:phasized "a heavy burden"
rests on thost: ;:ho would attack the judgment of the ::repre-

39)
sentatives of the people.
The first prong of the test requires the court to
r..a}:e a jUC'.:J'T.1ent as to the seriousness of the crime charged
and this of course invites the substitution of the subjective
40)

views of the judge for that o~ the legislature.

The

concern here is both constitutional and practical. We must
observe the doctrine of separation of powers as well as
41)

federalism.

This emphasizes the need for judicial restraint.

A practical consideration of course is the institutional
limitation. on judicial ' fact finding.
acting through commissions and

The legislature,

co~J!littees

with funds for

- 111 counsel, staff and public hearings is patently better equipp~d
than the judiciary to make the factual and social determinations
42)

which underlie any decision as to the gravity of a crime.
It is also more attuned to contemporary community standards
and can best judge the public's concern about particular

43)
criminal activity.
The second prong of the test is even more vulnerable
since it calls for a comparison by the judicial branch of
the statutory sentence ir.;posed for the crime ccrn."Tli tted with
those imposed for more serious offenses in the same jurisdiction.

The problem of determining the gravity of a particular

crime is di ff icul t enough ·with out having to make judgments
~bcut

other crimes.

It is rather simple to make a decision

that smoking in the subway is not as serious as rape.
ccmparing the crimes and

punis~~eno

But

for arson and kidnapping,

automobile larceny and drunken driving requires the digestion
.
of a vast amount of penological
available to the jurist.

sociowgical

and~ aat~

not usually

The ccrnparions cannot be mechanically

applied and the danger of the judicial substitution of its
judgment on a social issue fer that of the legislature

charge~

,

. :.,,_

a
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. - , ~-:~
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with the responsibility of making the decision initially,
is apparent.
The third step of the proportionality test requires
the court to compare the sentence under review with those
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime.

This is

the least susceptible to misuse as a tool facilitating the
substitution of individual judicial policy views for those
c f the legislature.

At t h e s ame time, it is f l aw ed a nd

is basically antagonistic to the principles of federalis m.
The Supreme Cou rt has recognized for example that there is
no national standard for obscenity and that the courts are
44)
to apply local corrununity standards.

Yet this leads to

the anomaly that while a jury is required to apply local
standards in determining whether or not an act is crirr.inally
cb s cene, natio na l s tandards are

e n c o urag e ~

to b e

co n sider e~

in determining whether the punishment is constitutional.
The rationale supporting the distinction of using local
standards to determine whether a First Amendment violation has
occurred but

C11..

natio~standard

to decide whether an Eighth

Ainendment infraction has transpired, is not at all clear .

• ._.!::lt"" ·.~ -:. : :... . • .

-

i . .:s

i '-

...

- lG The use of the standards of f orcign ncitions to
determine the constitutionality of punishment seems to be
generally of little or no help.

Aside from differing moral,

social and cultural standards, I would suspect that a few
years in a dungeon in some foreign climes can hardly be
compared with incarceration in most modern American penal
institutions.
In any event, a state may be faced with a
particularly virulent type of criminal activity and I submit
it should have some latitude in determining a strategy to
combat that crime and one means may be the
longer sentence.

i~position

of a

In Carmona v. Ward, the most recent case

in our circuit to c h aller.ge a prison terr.. as

u:r,ccns::.itu~ionc:.l

because of its length, we held it to be significant, as had
the New York Court of Appeals, that New York had a particularly
45)
acute drug problem.

The State legislature in 1967 had

embarked upon a penal law approach which emphasized treatment
cf the addict and not incarceration.

Six years and over 1

billion dollars later, the Legislature determined that the
progra~

was not successful anc adopted

admitte~ly

measures with life time maximum prison terms.

stern

46)

It is not
r--..

~

- .

..:· .d · :,;.,;.t~

!
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- 17 for the courts to determine the wisdom or effectiveness of
the program.

It has engendered criticism and it may well

not be working.

But the Legislature has already made changes

and is clearly in the best position to make more.
tpe drug statute not to be violative of the Constitutio

,. . ;~
.- -

and the Supreme Court denied certiorari--7-2 earlier this
48)

In conclusion I \·;ould pcint out that a prison tern
so cispr 0 portionate in length in comparison with the gravity
of the crime so as to shock the conscience should be held
to be cruel and unusua1 under the Eighth Amendment of the
Ccnsituticn.

~his

is so not because it was in the

~ind

c~

~~ ~

framers of the English Bill of Rights in 1689 either because
of the Bloody Assize or the trial of Titus Oates and not
because the founding fathers had it in
language of the prior act.

~ind

i~

adopting the

What books Jefferson may have

read hardly supports the inference that he believed the
maxim "let the punishment fit the crime" was of
dimension.

constitutionc.~

Nor do I believe that a lone dissent in O'Neil

v. Vermont or the majority opinion in Weems \·;hich involveC.
barbarous treatment necessarily preordained

acceptan~e
·J .

- ':. ..-. :=-: ~ .:. . --..

of

. ·.. -

~ · .--.

'

.
- 18 proportionality principle.

I

sc~

no

reuson~

to

~train

or

struggle with doubtful historical or judicial precedent
to establish the point.

Since barbarous methods of punish-

ment have generally disappeared, unless the Eighth Amendment
is to become totally moribund and the phrase simply a
shibboleth, it must apply to extraordinarily excessive
terms.

This we accept because as we have indicated the

dause

is evolutionary in character and not because the Founding
rathers had it in mind.
However, I also believe that
latures usually

co

state legis-

net act aberrantly and are normally

responsive to and reflect community standards.
~ederal

Unlike

judges wh o serve for life, the legislatcr

~ust

ansv.1 er to his cc n sti tu ency after relatively brief terr::s
of office.

The deference we must pay the legislative

determination is due not only to constitutional concepts
because of
of separation of powers and federalism but/the institutional
difficulty of the judiciary making the social, moral and
perological decisions inherent in the test which has
t e en constructed.

I believe it is of some significance that

in the most recent federal case in point the Fourth Circuit,

-.

• J
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49)
which had initially employed the proportionulity test;
has now refused to apply it at least where the sentence is
for a term of years.

It will set aside such a term which is

within the states statutory maxim only where there are
50)

"extraordinary

and special circumstances."

So called judicial activists of course will maintain
that the refusal to set aside admittedly harsh sentences
constitutes an abdication of our constitutional mandate.
this requires an uncerstanding of what .

But

cur constitutiona.l

really
mandate/is.
From the foregoing discussion, I submit that
our responsibility is narrow indeed.

Aside from the legis-

la-tive deterninc::tion r.iade by a state in casPS v;here the state
juC.iciary which has taken an oath to uphold the same Constituticr:.
as we have, has itself found the state statute nor to be
constitutionally defective, the role of the federal judiciary
becomes even less active.
I think the significant factor is judicial restraint.
I recall to you the Justice Frankfurter elegant articulation
of the point:
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not under our Constitution a

judicial remedy for every political mischief,
for every undesirable exercise of legislative
power.

In a democratic society like ours,

relief must come through an aroused popular
conscience that sears the conscience of the
51)

peoples representatives.
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As with most constitution a

anguage, "(t]he words [the

judge] must construe are empty vessels into which he can
pour anything at will."

Learned Hand, Sources of Tolerance,

29 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1, 12 (19·~3~0~)~-~~~~~~~--~~--2)

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664, 66-67 (1962).
In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892) the Court
had indicated that the Eighth Amendment was not binding on
the States.

3)

"My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time
To let the punishment fit the crime
The punishment fit the crime .• "
Gilbert & Sullivan, Mikado, Act II.

The Complete Plays of

Gilbert and Sullivan, 331 (Norton ed. 1976).
4)

E.G., Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted: ''

The Original Neaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839 (1969)

- 2 (hereinafter Granucci); Comment, The Eighth Amendment,
Beccaria, and the ~nlightenment:

An Historical Justifi- .

cation for the Weems v. United States Excessive Punishment
Doctrine, 24 Buffalo L. Rev. 783 (1975).
5)

E.G., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-22 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring); Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405,
425-27 (1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3460 (Jan. 8, 1979)
(Appendix to dissent of Judge Oakes); People v. Broadie, 37
N.Y.2d 100, 119-30, 371 N.Y.S.2d 741, 483-92, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 950 (1975)

6)

{appendix).

Granucci, supra, note 4, at 854.

Nor were the Stuarts the

first English monarchs to arouse public anger by inflicting
a penalty commonly believed to be disproportionate to the
offense.

Elizabeth in 1579 incurred public wrath by having

the right hand of an author, John Stubbs, and his printer,
William Page, hacked off for publishing an attack on a

-

3 -

marriage match that the aging queen desired with a French
nobleman.

Elizabeth was not unmoved by the public dissent;

she didn't stay the sentence but did send her personal
physician to attend to the wounds of the criminals.
Berleth, The Twilight of the Lords 26-27
7)

R.

(1978) .

Grannuci, supra, note 4, 57 Calif. L. Rev. at 859-60.

The

argument is adopted in Judge Oakes' dissenting opinion in
Carmona v. Ward, supra, at 425 & n.4.

See also

Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 318 & n.13.
8)

The Later Stuarts, G.N. Clark, Oxford p.90.

9)

Winston S. Churchill, A History of the English Speaking
Peoples, vol. 2, p.361.

10)

E. Dakers, Titus Oates 319 (1949).

11)
12)

See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).

- 4 13)

144 U.S. 323, 331 (1892).

The majority also opined that the

Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states.

Id. at 332.

But this view was expressly rejected in 1962.

See footnote

~~~f
{ i } ;pra.
14)

I

144 U.S. at 339.

It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice

Field accepted "whipping for petty offences" as a form of
punishment within the State's po~er.
15)

217 U.S. 349 (1910).

Id. at 340.

The Court was construing the

Philippines' bill of rights which contained a cruel
and unusual punishment clause identical to the language
of the Eighth Amendment.

Id. at 365,367.

16)

Id. at 364-66.

17)

Id. at 377.

18)

Id. at 380.

19)

Id. at 380-81.

20)

E.G., Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.

- 5 -

denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974); People v. Broadle, supra,
see 44 Fordham L. Rev. 637 (1975).
21)

Weems was not followed in Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1227,
1229-30 (4th Cir. 1978), where the issue was solely the
length of sentence unaccompanied by barbarous conditions.
See also Carmona v. Ward, supra, at 408 n.5.

A different

view is expressed by Judge Oakes' dissent in Carmona, at
420-21.
22)

217 U.S. at 379.

23)

Id. at 378.

24)

Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).

25)

370 U.S. 660 (1962).

2 G)

Kiiufrr,an, Prison:The Judge's Dilemma, 41 Fordham L. Rev.
495, 502 (1973).
H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 36 (1963).
also E. van den Haag, Punishing Criminals 4 (1975).
In Trop v. Dulles, supra, a plurality of the

See

Court concluded that denationalization for wartime
desertion was cruel and unusual punishment.

Although

the rationale of the decision is not entirely clear, the
Court explicitly rejected any argument that the punishment
was excessive in relation to the gravity of the crime.

28)

E.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (197C); Furman v. Georgia, supra.

29)

As Mr. Justice l·~arshall pointed out in Furman v. Georgia,
supra, at 346:
Death is irrevocable; life imprisonment is
not.

Death, of course, makes rehabilitation impossible;

life imprisonl11e n t does net.

In short, Ceath has always

been viewed as the ultimate sancticn, and it seens
perfectly reasonable to continue to view it as such.
30)

Coker v. Georgia, supra, at 592 (plurality opinion of

·-'

- 7 White, J., concurred in by Stewart, Blackman and
Stevens, JJ.); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
667 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173 (plurality
opinion of Stewart, J., in which Powell and Stevens,
JJ., concurred); Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 279
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 331 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
31)

Gregg v. Georgia, suora, at 175 (plurality opinion of Stew ~r~,

J., in which Powell and Stevens, JJ., concurred); accord,
Furman v. Georgia, supra, at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
see id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32)

Note 30, supra.

33)

People v. Broadie, supra, 37 N.Y.2d at 111, 371 N.Y.S.2d at
475.

34)

44 Fordham L. Rev. 637, 638-44 (1975).

In~eed,

even prier

to Weems Massachusetts had recognized the principle of

- 8 proportionality.

McDonald v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322,

328, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (1899).
35)

Carmona v. Ward, supra, at 409 and sources cited therein.

36)

Coker v. Georgia, supra, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10.

37)

Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 993 (1975) is the only
Circuit court case striking down a sentence for a term
~~~~~~~~-------....

of years solely because of its length.
f endant received a sentence of l 30 to 60 year <£

deimprisonment

for his first offense of possession and sale of a small
Compare
1193 (5th Cir. 1978)

Rurn.~el

v. Estelle, 568 F.2d

(as applied to petitioner, a Texas

statute mane.a.ting life impriso!h11ent u :) cn third ccr.viction
for any f elcny held violative of eighth amendment); Robert3
v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 973

(1972)

(setting aside on Eighth Amendment

- 9 grounds five yea~s of a twenty year assault sentence
to comport with maximum of assault with intent to murder,
of which simple assault is merely lesser included
offense); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 139 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974)

(mandatory life sentence

for third felony conviction unconstitutional where crimes
were perjury, passing $50 check with insufficient funds, and
transporting $140 of bad checks across state lines) .
also state court rulings in this area.

. See

In re Foss, 112

Cal. Rptr. 519 P.2d 1073 (1974); In re Lynch, 105 Cal. Rptr.
217, 503 P.2d 921 (1973)
Lorentzen, 387

~ich.

(and cases there cited); People v.

167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972).

38)

United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S.

(5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).

39)

Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 at 175-76.

40)

See Carmona v. Ward, supra, at 410-12; Rummel v. Estelle,
568 F.2d 1193, 1202 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)

(Thornberry, J.,

- 10 dissenting); see 52 N.C. L. Rev. 442, 452-53 (1973).

See

also 1976 Wisconsin L. Rev. 655, 667-69.
41)

-

It is often said, as it was recently by United States
_ __ _ _,_1 { ; ; )
District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., that"

e power

of the federal judiciary to review and to decide matters
involving the legislative and executive branches of
government is circumscribed by two basic constitutional
doctrines [separation of powers and federalism]."

Johnson,

The Role of the Judiciary With Respect to the Other Branches
of Goverrunent, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 455, 463 (1977).

However,

as Judge Johnson seE.Ins to realize, the effectiveness of
these principles as a check on judicial power depends
on self-restrc.int.

Id. at 466.

Where the juciciary is

concerned the appropriate question is indeed, "Quis custodiet
custodes?"
42)

See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1296-96 (1976).

- 11 43)

See Gregg v. Georgiu, supra, ut 175-75; J. Stephen, A
History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. II, 81-82
(1883).

However, even the legislature can be slow in

sensing the public judgment.

See J. Wilson, Thinking

About Crime 22-23 (1975).
44)

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

45)

Carmona v. Ward, supra, at 412.

46)

Id. at 413.

47)

Id. at 415-16 & n.19. Cf. Editorial, New York Times,
Januar

18, 1979 section A, page 20, col. · 1.

~~4-7, : :u=~·=s=·~L~·-w_.~3-4-60 (_J_an~·-8_,~1-97_9_>_·~~-t!f;;~
__

~

49)

See Hart v. Coiner, supra, 483 F.2d at 139- 4 0.
~

50)

Davis v. Davis, supra, 585 F.2d at 1233.

51)

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270
dissenting).

(1962)

(Frankfurter, J.,

